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Abstract: The Free Energy Principle (FEP) is currently one of the most promising frameworks with
which to address a unified explanation of life-related phenomena. With powerful formalism that
embeds a small set of assumptions, it purports to deal with complex adaptive dynamics ranging from
barely unicellular organisms to complex cultural manifestations. The FEP has received increased
attention in disciplines that study life, including some critique regarding its overall explanatory
power and its true potential as a grand unifying theory (GUT). Recently, FEP theorists presented a
contribution with the main tenets of their framework, together with possible philosophical interpre-
tations, which lean towards so-called Markovian Monism (MM). The present paper assumes some of
the abovementioned critiques, rejects the arguments advanced to invalidate the FEP’s potential to
be a GUT, and overcomes criticism thereof by reviewing FEP theorists’ newly minted metaphysical
commitment, namely MM. Specifically, it shows that this philosophical interpretation of the FEP
argues circularly and only delivers what it initially assumes, i.e., a dual information geometry that
allegedly explains epistemic access to the world based on prior dual assumptions. The origin of this
circularity can be traced back to a physical description contingent on relative system-environment
separation. However, the FEP itself is not committed to MM, and as a scientific theory it delivers
more than what it assumes, serving as a heuristic unification principle that provides epistemic
advancement for the life sciences.
Keywords: Free Energy Principle; Markovian Monism; grand unification theory; complex adaptive
systems; Bayesian brain; principle of individuation
1. Introduction
The Free Energy Principle (FEP) inspires one of the most comprehensive frameworks
for the study of complex adaptive systems. Originated by Karl Friston and colleagues, it
spans active research in several life science fields under the overarching principle of internal
free energy minimization. For this reason, the FEP can be counted among contemporary
attempts to understand complex systems through variational principles—see e.g., [1–4]
for a short review. However, the FEP seems to encompass a broader picture because of
its alleged ability to include more restricted approaches in neurosciences, including the
mind-brain problem ([5], p. 136). What is more, some scientific commentators claim it
might hold the key to artificial intelligence [6].
Throughout the last two decades, FEP formalism has been presented with technical
aspects that may prove threatening for the uninitiated. Admittedly, changes to notation
and symbols can misguide readers, hence FEP papers typically include tables with mathe-
matical definitions of key concepts and figures that help visualize the underlying schema.
Nevertheless, the theory increasingly appears as a promising and encompassing framework
to study living systems, both dia- and syn-chronically, and has already been considered in
the literature as a grand unifying theory (GUT) ([7], pp. 5–7) for the understanding of evo-
lution, sentience and consciousness, as well as of human cognition and the acquisition of
culture [8]. Some have even argued that the FEP introduces an unresolved tension between
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the secluded organism and its necessary openness and interaction with the environment,
which finds its philosophical home in Hegel’s dialectics [9].
During the last decade, criticism of the FEP has emerged, see e.g., [10]. They cannot but
be welcomed inasmuch as the FEP’s initial assumptions and philosophical consequences
require clarifications and discussion of their drawbacks. Recently, however, the FEP has
been attacked on more general grounds—targeted for its distinction as a possible GUT.
Whereas such criticism might be partially justified in terms of the FEP’s failure to achieve
its goal as it stands, it might also go too far and ruin the main thrust of scientific reduction.
Hence the existence of apparently irreducible models to explain, for instance, the activity
of mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic systems [7] need not necessarily count as evidence
against the FEP’s aspirations; on the contrary, it should stir up better explanations through
proper modeling within the FEP framework.
This paper assumes the FEP’s implicit claim of epistemic reduction in its understand-
ing of complex adaptive systems and concentrates on reviewing its explanatory power.
Beyond technical criticisms regarding the emergence of Bayesian inference via Markov
blankets and the FEP’s universality [11], Colombo and Wright [12] tried to clarify how the
FEP relates to the two most prominent theoretical approaches to life science phenomena,
namely organicism and mechanism. Notwithstanding, Friston and colleagues have recently
published a discussion of the FEP’s compatibility with different philosophical perspectives,
ranging from monism to dualism [13], and explicitly adopting what they dub Markovian
Monism (MM). This move naturally demands careful review of the philosophical assump-
tions behind the FEP’s main concepts and tenets, as well as its links (or lack thereof) to key
philosophical concepts like representation, supervenience and individuation.
Should the FEP’s newly minted ontology be understood as a response to general criticism
of the FEP as a GUT? The present work maintains both that foregoing critiques—especially
those by Colombo and Wright [12]—can be rejected on grounds other than MM and that the
latter is a misleading basis for the FEP framework due to its circular reasoning. After intro-
ducing the FEP’s main concepts and assumptions in non-technical jargon in Section 2, this
paper endeavors to (1) distinguish between misplaced and valuable criticisms in Colombo
and Wright’s review of the FEP by defending its role as a scientific theory (Sections 3 and 4)
and (2) assess the value of MM as an interpretation of the FEP. Section 5 distils the most
relevant ideas in MM, Section 6 makes explicit some of MM’s assumptions regarding key
philosophical concepts, and Section 7 begs the fundamental question of extant individual
systems in nature. Ultimately, the FEP may withstand criticism inasmuch as it is not com-
mitted to MM for two main reasons: First, as the FEP’s philosophical interpretation, MM
obtains what it assumes, i.e., a dual information geometry that allegedly explains epistemic
duality because of its prior, initial dual assumptions. Second, such circular reasoning
stems from the FEP’s implicit reliance on a non-fundamental, relative system-environment
separation. The conclusions herein explain why this double circularity proves harmless
for the FEP inasmuch as it remains a principle limited to science, providing epistemic
advancement to life sciences. Whereas the FEP as a scientific theory can be based on
such circularities, the FEP’s philosophical interpretations, like MM, cannot. Science needs
philosophical assumptions through which its theories can be linked with observations but
does not need to justify them if they remain open to philosophical criticism. However,
philosophical interpretations of scientific theories that aim at ultimate foundations may not
contain unresolved circular reasoning. That is why MM is a questionable philosophical
backdrop for the FEP.
2. The Main Assumptions of FEP Formalism
FEP formalism has been developed in several contributions in keeping with different
emphases [5,8,13–20]. By far, [21] provide the clearest introduction to this formalism
and its mathematical assumptions, with the meaning of symbols and equations carefully
spelled out.
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2.1. The Markov Blanket at the Core of the System/Environment Distinction
FEP defenders begin their description of systems of interest with the introduction of
Markov blankets as key to enabling a workable distinction between the system and the
environment. Even if not controversial in usual scientific activity, distinguishing between
system and environment is non-trivial in, e.g., quantum mechanics and entails some
relativity due to the observer’s involvement [22,23]. This methodological separation of
domains obeys practical criteria—including ranges of energy [24]—that are founded on
weak grounds.
The conceptual introduction of a Markov blanket not only allows for a well-defined
border between the system and the environment, but also permits the description of a
network of conditional interdependencies between the system, its Markov blanket, and the
environment. This allows for a useful mathematical description of the system and its overall
dynamics, both internal and as response to the environment. Within this basic framework, it
becomes possible to identify life-related phenomena as learning or cycles of perception and
action—see e.g., ([5], p. 128). For the sake of specificity and following the partition of [13],
one may consider the following relevant sets of states or degrees of freedom (I consider
both concepts equivalent throughout the paper) in the FEP framework: “external degrees of




, with j = 1, . . . , J;
“blanket degrees of freedom” = {sk} U {al}, with k = 1, . . . , K; l = 1, . . . , L; where
{sk} are “sensory degrees of freedom” and {al} are “active degrees of freedom”. Typically,
I J > K, L, which simply assumes that the environment has many more possible degrees
of freedom than the system and its internal degrees of freedom are usually more than its
sensory and active states.
The advantage of such factorization is that, in terms of probability distributions, a
Markov blanket renders internal states conditionally independent of external states. Ad-
ditionally, sensory states are not influenced by internal states and active states are not
influenced by external states [13]. In other words, system states’ initially obvious depen-
dence on environmental states is parametrized in such a way that it becomes mediated
by blanket degrees of freedom alone. The system always senses and acts on the world
through mediation of its own Markov blanket; its sensory states directly (By “directly”,
I mean here dependence at the same time. Obviously, across the system’s history, there
are many deferred dependencies (occurring at later times). Yet, formalism allows us to
concentrate on synchronic dependence.) depend on environmental states and its active
states depend on the system’s internal states, but not on environmental states. The former
describes how the environment impinges on the system and the latter how the system
deals with the environment. Factorization of dependencies between degrees of freedom
defines the system within the FEP framework.
2.2. Featuring System Dynamics: A Non-Equilibrium Steady State
Since blanket states also belong in system characterization and partake of system
dynamics, one may still consider the whole set of system or particular states as x ={
µj
}
U {sk} U {al}—see Figure 1 in [13]. Moreover, as long as a system does exist with its
own featuring states, one may safely assume Langevin dynamics to describe the change in
the system’s degrees of freedom over time: dx/dt = f (x, t) + ω, where x represents the
whole set of the system’s degrees of freedom, f (x, t) is a (hopefully) smooth function of
time and the degrees of freedom only and ω stands for random fluctuations. A further
assumption of the FEP framework is that the system always finds itself in a steady state of
non-equilibrium. This feature is a benchmark of complex adaptive systems but remains
controversial when examining if it suffices to encompass the whole system’s timespan.
I will come back to this issue in Section 7. For now, the assumption is that, given such
factorization (external, internal, sensory, and active states of a biological system) and their
relationships of conditional dependence or independence, one may just concentrate on the
system dynamics that make physical states be “confined to a bounded subset of states [an
attractor] and remain there indefinitely” ([12,16], p. 2106).
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The FEP framework thus assigns a probability distribution for the particular states,
p(x), and assumes the existence of an attractor in some region of the system’s phase space;
this attractor defines the system’s most probable states. In the steady state regime, the
probability of states within the attractor does not change over time even though the system
is far from thermodynamic equilibrium—resisting increasing entropy in the environment
whilst keeping its internal entropy at bay. p(x) must then satisfy the conditions of a
steady state solution for the Fokker Planck equation—see Figure 2 in [13] for details. If
one demands dp/dt = 0, the solutions point to, on average, states of any system with an
attracting set conforming to a gradient flow on surprisal, establishing a “lawful relationship
between the flow of states at any point in state space and the probability density”.
When dealing with the different terms of the steady state solution, there is some
freedom in how to identify them. For instance, in keeping with the factorization of par-
ticular states as internal and blanket degrees of freedom, “the mechanics of internal and
active states can be regarded as perception and action, where both are in the service of
minimizing a particular surprisal” ([13], n. 7). Again, beyond technicalities, it is important
to note that (1) identifications crucially depend on the Markov blanket partition and the
division between system and environment, (2) since sensory states do not directly depend
on internal states, they are not degrees of freedom influencing the gradient flow setting





{al}. The former can arguably be equated to “perception” and the latter to “action”. Hence,
the formalism built assuming a Markov blanket, Langevin dynamics, and a steady state
solution for the probability density of particular states could serve to describe, explain and
understand the whole range of phenomena related to complex adaptive systems.
2.3. Probability Distribution “of” and “about” Things
One key tenet of the FEP framework outlined here refers to the distinction made
between the probability distribution of things and the probability distribution about things.
This is because the system must hold “beliefs about external states that are parametrized,
represented, encoded or coherent with internal states”. What facts support such a bold
claim? Basically the fact that, thanks to factorization via the Markov blanket—which makes
external and internal states directly independent—there must be a 1:1 relationship between
a system’s average internal state and a probability density over its external states: “The
mapping between the expected (i.e., average) internal state (for any given blanket state)
and a conditional density over external states (i.e., a Bayesian belief about external states)
inherits from the conditional independencies that define a Markov blanket” [13]. In its
full splendor, this is the benefit of interacting with and representing the external world via
Markov blankets.
Turning back to probability distribution p(x), one is thus entitled to consider the






in such a way that, by design, such conditioning determines how the system experiences
the outer world. External states of affairs can only be represented probabilistically in a
way that depends upon the Markov blanket’s dimensionality, namely K + L. The FEP
framework thus associates beliefs with the probability density that is parametrized by
(expected) internal states. The probability density over external states q({ηi}) updated




is now featured by a probabilistic belief that is






is the system’s best guess about
q({ηi}), and is obviously conditioned by the system’s internal states fulfilling the steady
state non-equilibrium condition and its blanket states.
We see now that, in keeping with formalism and its interpretive possibilities, internal
states stand in not just for themselves, but also represent what the system believes about the
outer world. In other words, the probability distribution p(x) is a probability distribution
of internal states and of beliefs about external states, see Equation (4) in [13]. Consequently,
were someone to define a measure of distance between different probabilities in probability
space and obtain a probability geometry, there is a unique geometry in some belief space
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that can be associated with the system’s internal (physical) state. Within the same formalism
and for probability distribution, one may consider an intrinsic or extrinsic geometry that is
contingent upon measuring distances between probabilities of internal (physical) states or
measuring distances between probabilities of beliefs (about external states), respectively.
(Whereas description of the system in terms of trajectories in phase space over time defines
its “intrinsic geometry”, “extrinsic geometry” is not in a phase space of states, but rather
related to a statistical manifold. A statistical manifold is a space with coordinates that
are the sufficient statistics of families of probability densities or distributions; sufficient
statistics are the numbers that define a given probability distribution. This dual or conjugate
aspect of information geometry is more specifically tackled in Section 5.1) The powerful
idea behind this is that by assuming that a system does exist, with the help of the Markov
blanket factorization, one naturally obtains “beliefs” as internal representations of the
external world.
2.4. Free-Energy Minimization as Bayesian Dynamics: Two Sides of the Same Coin
If we turn back to system dynamics, as described in Section 2.2 the gradient flows
that outline the dynamics of particular states can be interpreted as a gradient flow on a
variational free energy functional, i.e., a function of how beliefs are encoded in internal
states and of active and sensory states as well. The FEP affirms that, so long as a Markov
blanket is in play, gradient flow on variational free energy in phase space over time is
equivalent to gradient flow on variational free energy in a statistical manifold, where
the sufficient statistics relate to beliefs or probability distributions about external states.
Actually, things become a bit more complex because free energy is shown to be an upper
bound to surprisal—see, e.g., ([25], pp. 425–426) or Equation (5) in [13]. This is because free
energy can be decomposed as the sum of surprisal and the Kullback-Leibler divergence
between two density distributions: one of them regarding the probability of external states
conditioned by blanket states; the other one encoding beliefs about the probability of
external states in the system’s internal states. The Kullback-Leibler divergence is non-
negative and quantifies how similar the probability density encoding beliefs is to the
probability density of external states conditioned by blanket states. Hence, minimizing
free energy is operationally equivalent to minimizing surprisal. (The general validity of
this procedure has recently been called into question [11]. More specifically, it remains
controversial that encoding external states via internal states is the best way to keep steady
state dynamics and Kullback-Leibler divergence between the two probability densities low.)
Since sensory states do not directly depend on the system’s internal states, it will seem
like the latter are trying to minimize exactly the same quantity, namely the surprisal of
states that constitute the system. Such autonomous states can be equated with action and
perception seeking to minimize surprisal or its upper bound, free energy. One might also
deem minimization of particular surprisal as maximization of the value of the system’s
state or a sort of “generalized homeostasis”. (See [26] for a more rigorous treatment in the
context of analytical mechanics. However, that the concept of value can be equated with
homeostasis in living systems, especially in the context of process philosophy, remains
controversial [27].) The crucial point is that, in adapting its dynamics to minimize free en-
ergy, the system can also be understood as correspondingly changing its beliefs in keeping
with Bayesian rules for updating probability densities about external states whenever new
evidence is available. Because active states depend upon internal states and the beliefs that
they parametrize, but not upon external states, it will look as if the system is acting on the
basis of its beliefs about external states [13].
All these formulations are internally consistent with frameworks like the Bayesian
brain hypothesis [28]. A system’s beliefs need not be propositional, but simply should be
in line with Bayesian beliefs, i.e., conditional probability distributions that are manifest
in the sense of being encoded by a physical system’s internal states. The link between
inference processes and minimization of cost functions, which runs through a multitude of
problems in different disciplines, is made explicit in the FEP framework. This is a small
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wonder inasmuch as “variational free energy is always implicitly or explicitly under the
hood of any inference process, ranging from simple analyses of variance through to the
Bayesian brain”. Notably, “the very existence of something leads in the natural way to
a whole series of optimization frameworks in the physical and life sciences that lends
each a construct validity in relation to the others” [13]. A generalized version of the FEP
framework, involving policies that encompass priors over outcomes and different time
scales over which to minimize free energy according to the system’s activity, has also
been successfully introduced [29]. Briefly put, active inference is the counterpart of FEP
formalization [30,31] and might lead to allostasis as a link from generalized homeostasis
to the critical self-organization of life, as well as open up new paths for modeling the
emergence of consciousness [32–34].
3. The (Misplaced) Criticism of the FEP as a GUT
Before we turn to the philosophical questions raised by the FEP framework and its
characterization of complex adaptive systems, it is worth devoting some space to Colombo
and Wright’s critique of the FEP’s attempt to reach GUT status [7]. These authors draw on
a purportedly central case, the activity of mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic (DA) systems,
in which the different explanatory models for DA systems, namely anhedonia, incentive
salience, and reward prediction error hypotheses, seem to vindicate explanatory pluralism
and demonstrate that scientific progress in the cognitive sciences is unlikely to be associated
with a single overarching GUT. Is such an inference justified?
In cognitive science, the FEP framework can be interpreted as a form of error correction
via Bayesian dynamics of previous beliefs, instantiated by a bidirectional cascade of cortical
processing, see e.g., [28,35–37]. In fact, human observers behave as optimal Bayesian
observers in many ways ([38], p. 712). Each level’s basic schema sets out that, “feed-
forward connections convey information about the difference between what was expected
and what actually obtained—i.e., prediction error—while feedback connections convey
predictions from higher processing stages to suppress prediction errors at lower levels” ([7],
p. 5). With its conceptual simplicity and powerful formalism, the free energy theory lends
the ultimate rationale for Bayesian cycles of perception and action, attaining the goal of
unification and scientific reduction of other higher-level explanatory principles (e.g., those
utilized in psychology).
Nevertheless, Colombo and Wright [7] complain about what, for the time being,
is only a would-be GUT. Currently, the FEP suggests the possibility of genuine future
inter-theoretic reductions of higher-level theories to the FEP framework. However, the
three abovementioned models regarding the activity of mesocorticolimbic DA systems
remain irreducible and, contrary to GUT expectations, show how actual scientific practice
vindicates explanatory pluralism. For instance, terms like reward and value are deemed
irreducible via mathematical ‘absorption’ in favor of prior beliefs. Explanatory pluralism
rejects the suggestions that, for any phenomenon, there will always be exactly one single,
complete, comprehensive explanation based on a single set of fundamental principles. It
assumes that scientific theories co-evolve and mutually influence one another without
lower-level theories supplanting higher-level theories and hypotheses. It is precisely this
inter-theory competition and selection pressure that accelerates scientific progress. Hence,
“[p]rogress in neuroscience is ill-served by fervently advancing a single GUT of mind/brain
that attempts to solve all problems. Rather, it is more productive to focus experimental
and theoretical research on some problems, and to generate a plurality of solutions that
compete as local explanations and narrowly-conceived hypotheses” ([7], pp. 6–11).
My argument is that, within this scientific context, the foregoing remarks are mis-
placed and unfair to the FEP framework. Not only does some of this critique turn out to
be controversial, like the alleged irreducibility of reward and value to the role of priors,
but, more importantly, denying the legitimacy of attempts at GUTs—even if only within
neurosciences—entails a narrowly-conceived view of science. There might well be sim-
plified, higher-level models to tackle specific practical problems, but scientific activity
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cannot dispense with its search for greater unification without putting meaning at risk
or, worse, becoming sheer empiricism. True, Colombo and Wright [7] point out relevant,
specific problems that the FEP framework needs to tackle in order to keep up with its
aspirations to become a GUT. Yet, FEP does not claim at this stage to be a GUT; to date,
it provides theoretical neuroscience and life disciplines with a new paradigm that can,
in principle, encompass otherwise partial frameworks and shallower explanatory logics,
much as evolution became the universally shared framework for biology. And, of course,
the FEP may become ultimately unsuccessful.
The existence of hitherto irreducible models is not a drawback, but rather stimulates
the search for more complete scientific explanations, which is a deeper stimulus than
underscoring the mutual benefit of theories’ pluralistic co-evolution ([7], pp. 10–11).
Colombo and Wright do not justify their pluralistic approach with such difficulties more
than difficulties in explaining specific transitional states could justify finishing off the
evolutionary framework. Moreover, explanatory pluralism as a last-ditch epistemic strategy
smacks of an attempt at unassailability and obtains little by dismissing the epistemic core
of scientific explanation. Does this mean that a scientific GUT, like the FEP aims to be, is
bound to be the ultimate explanation? Not necessarily since GUTs may urgently require
philosophical clarifications and/or interpretations. I will address this issue in Sections 5–7
when discussing MM, but let us first identify more profound critiques of the FEP in the
foregoing authors.
4. Valuable Critiques of the FEP
Fortunately, Colombo and Wright have other relevant and timely critiques of the
FEP that deserve closer inspection [12]. They ask for the detailed philosophical review
in Sections 5–7 and require clarification of the FEP’s epistemic status: “FEP’s epistemic
status remains opaque, along with its exact role in biological and neuroscientific theorizing.
Conspiring against its accessibility are the varying formalisms and formulations of FEP,
the changing scope of application, reliance on undefined terms and stipulative definitions,
and the lack of clarity in the logical structure of the reasoning leading to FEP”.
Colombo and Wright initially praise the FEP framework as a powerful attempt at
blending biology and information that might also illuminate the continuity between life
and mind, as the FEP applies to any biological system. Nevertheless, concerns arise due
to the FEP’s apparent silence on the nervous system’s biophysical reality and its implicit
commitment to some form of cognitivism, where cognition is taken for granted within
a functional scheme. However, functional analyses lack explanatory power as they are
“sketches of mechanisms, in which some structural aspects of a mechanistic explanation are
omitted. Once the missing aspects are filled in, a functional analysis turns into a full-blown
mechanistic explanation” ([39], p. 283). Accordingly, mechanists play down the FEP’s
explanatory role because of its lack of specific analysis, including the biophysical details
to localize each operation with its respective component part: “Phenomena studied in
the life sciences should be explained by appealing to the component parts and operations
of mechanisms, where a mechanism is a spatiotemporally-organized composite system
producing a phenomenon” [12]; see e.g., [40–42] for an improved mechanistic explana-
tion of complex adaptive systems. Briefly stated, for mechanists, efficiency and structure
determine form and function. However, obviously this perspective is itself highly con-
troversial. (Functional explanations allow emergent functions to be realizable in multiple
ways in complex adaptive systems, obviously supported by microphysical states, but not
necessarily reducible to the latter’s dynamics. In this sense, functional explanations may
provide functions with an ontological status beyond epiphenomenalism, which reductive
mechanists may see as a drawback.)
However, to avoid getting ahead of myself, here I will focus on criticism from the
organicist perspective, which raises serious doubts about the ability of physics to adequately
represent organisms and their behaviors. On the one hand, organicists accuse FEP theorists
of too quickly ascribing FEP framework properties and tools to organisms. Do free energy,
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surprise, and optimization exist as biological properties in complex adaptive systems? One
could bring such concerns to the general problem of representation in scientific theories,
which affects topics beyond the FEP framework, although obviously exceeds the scope of
this paper.
On the other hand, organicists heavily criticize the FEP’s crucial assumption about
ergodicity over the system’s span of existence. This assumption might lead towards insuffi-
cient characterizations of the organism’s phenotype and defining properties. Admittedly,
FEP theorists always introduce the caveat of applying formalism to well-defined, steady
phases of the system’s life because, by definition, the FEP framework cannot deal with
processes like death. Ergodicity “only holds over certain temporal scales for real organisms
that are on a trajectory from birth to death” ([5], sec. S1). Yet, such statements seem to fall
into a sort of tautology, as the FEP framework works for ergodic phases and is unable to
predict more complicated life phenomena related to phase transitions. In other words, over-
all, life behaves non-ergodically for organicists. Organisms “live” in extended critical phase
transitions [43] or on the edge of order and chaos in the region of criticality [44,45], which
disavows homeostatic stability as the core feature of living systems. (One anonymous
reviewer pointed out that “ergodicity is not a problem for the FEP framework because the
FEP framework only assumes local ergodicity: relative to the parts that make it up, each
whole looks stationary”. Obviously, such a view is highly problematic when degrees of
freedom are redefined and parts of the alleged whole are redefined—what is related to the
individuation problem, more on this in Section 7. Certainly, even if life might be globally
non-ergodic, it is locally ergodic enough to, e.g., be considered as having locally stable
properties. Nevertheless, the problem arises at critical transition points. To follow up with
an analogy suggested by the reviewer, Earth might be flat enough to build skyscrapers, but
not to assume that interoceanic flights follow a straight line. To put it plainly, one must
be aware of accumulated error in dealing with living systems as a temporal line of stable
cycles. Such error may dramatically increase when it comes to a critical point.)
If that is the case, proper description of life might be not only non-computable in
a finite number of steps, but also non-algorithmic. Because of their intrinsic historicity,
organisms need not possess general characteristics that allow for complete mathematically
invariant representations. Up to what point can one speak of biological symmetries that
have to be preserved? Certainly, one is allowed to tackle such symmetries as a good ap-
proximation to life characteristics—see e.g., [46]—but breaks in symmetry that redefine the
relationships between system and environment continually occur and some contingency
beyond general principles might be crucial for understanding organisms. Organicists reject
mere adaptationist and selectionist perspectives because of their insufficient explanation of
the autonomy of living beings for regulating their processes in relation to environmental
conditions [12]. On the contrary, FEP advocates rely on the power of formalism to incorpo-
rate any regulation whatsoever. Such disagreement becomes transparent in the conceptual
differences regarding what counts as “surprising” for an organism. Whilst organicists
stress that surprising events need not always be maladaptive for organisms, Friston and
colleagues answer by nuancing the term “surprise”, making it contingent upon the context
in which the FEP framework works and the “temporal depth” and “epistemic affordances”
of different kinds of sentient systems [13].
Importantly, the FEP framework relies on representations of the external world via a
generalized inferential picture of cognition. Obviously, the system needs to start sampling the
environment according to certain prior beliefs—equivalent to setting initial conditions—that
allegedly recapitulate environmental patterns, but do not in themselves enable efficient
inference; the FEP needs to be invoked for that. However, it might also happen that, even
if formalism by construction converges on a course of action, trajectory or policy, it fails to
reproduce the actual system behavior because of unforeseeable changes in its phase space.
Last but not least, since the FEP framework admits the duality of information geometries in
its probability distributions —intrinsic (for physical states) and extrinsic (referring to belief
states)—how should such probabilities be consistently interpreted? Are interpretations of
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probabilities as physical propensities compatible with interpretations of probabilities as
cognitive inferences at all levels? If, as Colombo and Wright argue [12], Friston interprets
probabilities involved in the FEP as objective features of systems [17], a clash seems to
emerge between (physical) propensities as causal tendencies that should be asymmetric,
like causal relationships, and epistemic probabilities (cognitive inferences) that should
not. Conditional probabilities can be reversed—in this sense, they are symmetric, even
if reversed conditional probability might be very different from the initial probability.
However, cause and effect relationships cannot in general be reversed. Convergence of the
information geometry’s dual aspects onto a single objective probability may thus not be
that straightforward. (The degree of identification between the two aspects in information
geometry is far from clear, as Kiefer has recently pointed out [47]. Obviously, if one-to-
one correspondence is relaxed, MM is in trouble as an ontology for the FEP. As a matter
of fact, the identification of physical and cognitive aspects in a single physical concept
is becoming fashionable in some theories about consciousness. The most well-known
example is Integrated Information Theory (IIT)—see e.g., [3], where phenomenological
axioms are straightforwardly translated into mathematical axioms. Yet, such a procedure is
defective without further clarification [48].)
5. MM as the Philosophical Position Adopted by FEP Theorists
Understandably, critiques reviewed in the last section prompt discussion on the FEP’s
philosophical interpretations found at the end of [13]. In that work, the authors support
MM and establish connections with extant theories regarding the relationship between
mind and matter, such as neutral monism, panprotopsychism, dual-aspect theories, and
physicalism. As they note from the outset, “[t]he deeper philosophical issue of sentience
speaks to the hard problem of tying down quantitative experience or subjective experience
within the information geometry afforded by the Markov blanket construction”. This
section picks up that gauntlet and engages in the philosophical fray to assess the benefits
and shortcomings of MM, and then discusses other, more pressing philosophical issues in
Sections 6 and 7.
5.1. A Dual-Aspect Dynamic







[13], assume the existence of a generative model of the








, as the best guess for q({ηi}),
i.e., beliefs about the environment encoded in the particular (given) system’s state x ={
µj
}
U {sk} U {al}. (For details on how such probability densities relate to one another see
e.g., [20,49].) p and p′ stand in 1:1 correspondence, thus defining information geometries
for both in such a way that the “[t]he extrinsic geometry [of p′] is conjugate to the intrinsic
geometry [of p] but measures distances between beliefs. Both are measurable, and both
supervene on the same Langevin dynamics”. (The Markov blanket ensures that both
geometries coincide and allows for the remarkable observation that the non-equilibrium
steady state density towards which the system evolves (in terms of its intrinsic geometry)
can be interpreted as a statistical or generative model in terms of its extrinsic geometry—i.e.,
as the joint probability density over systemic or particular states (internal and blanket
states) and external states.) Internal states possess a dual aspect information geometry
that does not, in and of itself, give a system mental states and consciousness; instead, it
only confers computational properties. However, even though physical and computational
properties are not identical, “the extrinsic information geometry is ultimately reducible
to the intrinsic information geometry (and the other way around), in the sense that there
is a necessary link between them”. (As a consequence, this ultimate reduction can only
mean embracing a compatibilist view on the problem of free will.) One is thus permitted
to express system dynamics “in terms of forces supplied by the extrinsic, belief-based
information geometry”, because “[t]he forces that engender our physical dynamics can
either be expressed as thermodynamic forces or as self-evidencing; in virtue of the extrinsic
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information geometry supplied by variational free energy”. The latter “is a feature of an
extrinsic information geometry induced by beliefs encoded by internal states that have an
intrinsic information geometry” [13].
Complexity becomes a matter of temporal depth, with time scales as grey zones—without
clear-cut thresholds—which nevertheless allow us to distinguish between different kinds
of systems. Self-organization is simply implied by quick convergence on minimal free
energy whilst complex adaptive systems present an adaptive response to changes in
their environment that “will look as if they are selecting their long-term actions on the
basis of an expected free energy”. Humans, for instance, will possess “deep generative
models that see far into the future; enabling a move from homoeostasis to allostasis and,
effectively, the capacity to select courses of action that consider long term consequences”.
Inasmuch as the system does have temporal depth, it needs to implement estimates of
the changing environment through a changing generative model. Hence, within the FEP
framework, intentional behavior looks like uncertainty resolving, information seeking,
epistemic foraging [13]. However, this is just the dual aspect of underlying physical
dynamics spawned by the Markov blanket’s partition of system and environment.
5.2. MM Rejects Dualism
Friston and colleagues adopt MM as the better metaphysical position to support the
FEP framework. MM can be summed up in these two affirmations: “(1) Fundamentally,
there is only one type of thing and only one type of irreducible property . . . (2) All systems
possessing a Markov blanket have properties that are relevant for understanding the mind
and consciousness: if such systems have mental properties, then they have them partly by
virtue of possessing a Markov blanket” [13]. Of course, one might already question the
meaning of “partly” in the second claim, which features an allegedly monist position, and
whether such a clarification is compatible with the first claim.
The crucial argument draws on the inter-theoretical relationship between the two pos-
sible (considerations of) information geometries (corresponding to p and p′) and between
the properties involved. “Since the dynamics that can be described with reference to these
properties can equivalently be described without regarding internal states as representa-
tions of probability distributions, there is a sense in which both perspectives are reducible to
one another. Hence, the dual information geometry itself does not entail property dualism”.
The only possible interpretation of such a claim is that the “dual aspect” of information
geometry is merely epistemic, by no means ontic. Moreover, supposedly irreducible mental
properties would have to be largely independent of extrinsic information geometry, in
blatant contradiction with FEP formalism [13].
FEP theorists acknowledge that FEP formalism could be deemed compatible with
(property) dualism but—were that the case—the latter could not explain the existence of
minds and consciousness by leveraging properties entailed by the existence of a Markov
blanket, even if such properties are identified with protophenomenal properties [13].
Property dualism, according to these authors, demands causes and explanations that differ
from those that MM is able to supply. However, strong evidence for the realism demanded
by property dualism seems to be lacking—with MM as the best metaphysical option. We
will turn back to this issue when reflecting on the implicit assumptions that undergird the
FEP framework in the next sections.
5.3. MM in Favor of Reductive Materialism
Not surprisingly, MM fares better in the company of metaphysical accounts from neu-
tral monists. The former might be considered a specific version of the latter “in which basic
entities are intrinsically neither mental nor physical”—the last two qualifications being two
conjugate ways of describing existing stuff. Nevertheless, [13] warn against a surreptitious
realist interpretation of both descriptions in terms of extrinsic information geometry, which
could sneak property dualism in through the back door. MM’s metaphysical commitment
becomes crystal clear when stating that it “is similar to dual-aspect monism . . . in that it
Entropy 2021, 23, 238 11 of 17
entails that one and the same thing (i.e., internal states of a system possessing a Markov
blanket) can be viewed from two perspectives”. But differences do exist between MM
and dual-aspect (neutral) monism: “In order to count as a dual-aspect monism, these two
perspectives would have to be mutually irreducible . . . we are skeptical that this would
be a coherent interpretation of the dual information geometry”. Briefly put, differences
between MM and dual-aspect monism arise out of the purported reducibility of extrinsic
to intrinsic information geometry in MM.
What other options are available? MM can ground other versions of reductive ma-
terialism, namely a physicalist interpretation. One might thus assume that such choice
is motivated by physics’ (alleged) ability to explain the dual aspect of the system’s infor-
mation geometry. In reality, “[t]here are no additional, non-reducible properties, which
are necessary to explain the mind and consciousness; between some non-conscious and
conscious systems, there is only a gradual difference”. An implicit recourse to sorites
paradoxes—arising from vague predicates—thus transpires when claiming vagueness for
consciousness: “If consciousness is a vague concept (as suggested by our interpretation
of Markovian Monism), then the right structure and functions can be metaphysically
sufficient for consciousness, even if adding just a bit of structure and function to any
uncontroversially non-conscious system does not make it conscious” [13]. Even though
there are still categorical differences that can be described in terms of more high-level prop-
erties, e.g., intentionality and computation, such categories stand in the epiphenomenal
realm of physicalist interpretations. Friston and colleagues map the distinction between
conscious/non-conscious systems to temporally deep/shallow generative models—which,
according to them, is vague and just a quantitative issue. Consequently, MM too serves as
a foundation for physicalist approaches to consciousness and the mind.
6. What Matters Philosophically: The Implicit Made Explicit
The previous section surveyed some philosophical tenets related to MM as the suppos-
edly best ontology for the FEP, while hinting at its potential problems. In this section, I will
endeavor to make explicit some FEP assumptions as a comprehensive scientific program to
deal with life phenomena and demonstrate the sense in which said assumptions invalidate
the MM perspective. This section aims to show that, contrary to criticisms of the FEP’s
attempt at being a GUT on behalf of epistemic pluralism [7], one should cling to scientific
reduction as much as possible and, within the conceptual framework set up by the FEP, seek
to elucidate the latter’s epistemic advancement. In keeping with this viewpoint, critique of
philosophical perspectives and of scientific concepts can more productively come together.
6.1. Representation, Probability and Optimization
Assuming the validity of the system/environment partition through a Markov blanket—
first circularity—the FEP framework’s central hypothesis is that systems do represent the
outer world via their internal states—second circularity. This hypothesis is at the core
of the correspondence between p and p′ and, consequently, of the existence of intrinsic
and extrinsic information geometries for the probability distribution of particular states.
Obviously, the term “representation” is highly controversial both in cognitive science and
contemporary epistemology, (See e.g., [50]. For an overview of the issues surrounding
representationalism here, see [20,51–53]) but, beyond ongoing debates, it is relevant to
consider the emergence of internal representation itself in some living systems during the
course of evolution. In other words, if representation is such a crucial concept for the FEP’s
performance, discussion of it should go beyond vague descriptions. One could also just
speak of information processing; however, internal representation seems closely related to
cognition as a product of biological processes. Yet, cognition—or at least some sophisticated
level of cognition—is made possible by the presence of a nervous system; to simply equate
cognition or internal representation with the ability to generate a response to environmental
stimulus in the Markov blanket stretches the term as to make it meaningless, according
to some authors ([54], pp. 206–207). If the FEP strives to encompass the evolutionary
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framework too, the emergence of representation in living systems should not be taken for
granted.
The FEP’s internal representations take on a probabilistic nature. Information is
encoded and computed through probability density functions or approximations thereof:
“This treatment assumes that the system’s state and structure encode an implicit and
probabilistic model of the environment” ([18], p. 70). Needless to say, throughout the
history of philosophy of science, the very concept of probability oscillates between extreme
objectivity and extreme subjectivity, not to mention its essential role in Quantum Mechanics
and related interpretations, where probability is hotly debated as a primitive or derivative
concept. The point here is not realism or antirealism of scientific theories, as briefly
mentioned in Section 4, but the internal coherence of the concept of probability implicitly
endorsed by the FEP. To wit, on the one hand, the probabilistic representation of the
environment underlies the system’s cascade of Bayesian inferences, making it deeply
“subjective” in the sense of system-dependent; on the other hand, probabilities must be
objective if the FEP’s overall framework means something and if physicalism and the
MM interpretation can be meaningfully held. Hence, it seems that the use of the terms
representation and probabilistic representation have not been sufficiently thought through
within MM. From its inception, the FEP’s key concepts contain an implicit duality between
physics and internal representations that is fully disclosed in the dual information geometry
of the probability distributions.
Sure enough, the FEP framework exploits the powerful feature of variational methods
to tackle statistical inference problems as optimization problems ([12], n. 6). Nevertheless,
the shadow of secondary circularity looms large throughout the whole procedure inasmuch
as physical interactions and internal representations remain conceptually entangled when-
ever inference (epistemic) is reduced to optimization (ontic). Let me illustrate this point
with a clarifying example. For the whole variational procedure to make sense and the risk
of infinite regress to be ruled out, one needs to begin mathematically with some priors that
are usually chosen using random values. Of course, one legitimate procedure for solving
the optimization problem does not and cannot provide a single cue about the origin of
priors in the actual inference process. It is one thing, as a scientist, to seed a well-defined
optimization procedure with random priors to hopefully mimic some aspect of reality;
another very different thing concerns whether and how inference works in actual natural
systems. (In the FEP framework, one may always say that priors are just empirical priors.
For example, yesterday’s posterior is today’s prior. This means priors always inherit from
somewhere else. This can be seen structurally in hierarchical generative models, where the
priors at one level can be regarded as likelihoods from the point of view of the level above.
But this answer simply begs the ontological question since levels are a priori constructed
within each concrete FEP model.) As I will show in the last section, once we reckon the
FEP limits, the abovementioned circularities are not necessarily a drawback for the FEP as
a scientifically valid framework; they are, though, when FEP is interpreted through MM.
6.2. Supervenience, Causality and Individuation
Friston and colleagues’ reference to the emergence and coexistence of a duality, in-
trinsic and extrinsic, in information geometry is extremely illustrative. Through the free
energy minimization procedure, “belief updating and statistical thermodynamics both
supervene on the same internal manifold”. If “[i]t is tenable to associate physics (in the
sense of quantum, statistical and classical) mechanics with the intrinsic information ge-
ometry” [13], the logical consequence is to associate extrinsic information geometry with
internal beliefs. However, whereas the possibility that statistical thermodynamics may
supervene on ultimately physical stuff seems relatively straightforward, the sense in which
beliefs also supervene on the same stuff remains much more controversial.
Be that as it may, supervenience is the philosophical concept used to allow for the
dual aspect of the systems’ internal basic stuff. As is well known, the explanatory power of
supervenience is also highly controversial, though supervenience is usually deemed a good
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ally of physicalism ([55], sec. 5.4), the grounding pillar of MM. Even though “Bayesian
mechanics must still apply, even during the suspension of any coupling with blanket
states” [13], one might consider the corresponding extrinsic information geometry as purely
remnant. The supervenient mechanics of beliefs need not have causal power since internal
dynamics can also be explained without reference to extrinsic information, as physicalism
requires. However, from the viewpoint of metaphysical causation supervenience is a
descriptive label that still has to come to terms with causes. Here, one may recall the
mechanist critique of the FEP: “Filling out the mechanism sketch is what matters: appeals to
the mechanism of predictive coding—not FEP—are what provides explanatory depth” [12].
Noticeably, affirming in the extended FEP framework that, “the expected free energy
influences policy selection” and “that future or latent outcomes have the potential to
influence beliefs about past states” ([29], p. 503) seems to imply that the future influences
the past, which does not easily harmonize with a strict, non-retrocausal physicalism.
The hidden problem in the preceding discussion has to do with a lack of explicitness
regarding the FEP framework’s implicit assumptions. Such need for explicitness behooves
philosophical criticism. In fact, some of the model’s underlying causal hypotheses more or
less overtly reveal themselves during the technical resolution of a free-energy minimization.
Lastly, since the FEP is formalized by a set of differential equations, well-defined criteria
for the establishment of effective boundary conditions are mandatory. Yet, such technical
requirements bring us back to the system’s very definition and individuation with the
help of its Markov blanket: “This move is crucial for elaborating a physics of sentience,
in which physical dynamics entail probabilistic beliefs about something . . . there would
be no quantum or statistical mechanics in the absence of Markov blankets” [13]. These
authors are thus bound to a notion of duality or conjugacy required by the Markov blanket
partition, but that proviso inevitably begs deeper questions. Namely, what is an individual
system? What kind of causality does it entail that allows scientists to speak of systems and
Markov blankets?
7. What Is an Individual System?
One of organicists’ deepest criticisms of the FEP, as hinted at in Section 4, amounts
to the degree of specificity of physical systems. “If historical considerations and lineage
matter to understanding organisms and their dynamics, then biological systems should be
represented as ‘specific’ and their trajectories as ‘generic.’ Instead . . . free-energy theorists
get it backward: physical systems are ‘generic,’ while their trajectories ‘specific’” ([12,43],
Chapter 7). Behind that critique, one may divine a certain mistrust for understanding
individual organisms through the FEP alone. Moreover, if living systems are not just
optimization processes, but rather “extended critical transitions, always transient toward a
continually renewed structure” ([43], p. 162), their individuality may turn out to be unique
in the sense of the impossibility of wholly explaining them away by general principles.
Remarkably enough, FEP theorists start off with the observation that some systems
maintain their physical integrity, displaying adaptive behavior in a changing environment.
Systems are featured as remaining in a non-equilibrium steady state, within a relatively
narrow region of all possible states of their initial phase space. If that is the case, Markov
blankets can be deemed objective features of nature, separating biological systems’ internal
states from those external to them [17]. Then, “by acting on the environment to minimize
the free energy of their sensory samples, biological systems would avoid surprising sensory
states. If they avoid surprising sensory states, biological systems may attain a homeostatic
state; and by selecting actions that attain homeostatic states, biological systems will thereby
behave adaptively and preserve their physical integrity” [12].
However, such “generalized homeostasis” ([13], n. 7) rests upon delicate, non-
fundamental, stipulations—e.g., contingent upon a concrete range of energy exchange for
some timespan (the duration over which the system exists) between the system and the
environment. Only within that regime does it make sense to a priori define the relevant
degrees of freedom for the system, including a specific Markov blanket parametrizing
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the system’s interaction with the environment. Yet, is it possible to a priori define the
relevant degrees of freedom or states for complex adaptive systems? Such systems can
continually increase the diversity of what happens next [45]. How might we define the sys-
tem’s relevant degrees of freedom in fundamental terms when complex adaptive systems’
autopoiesis remains controversial [56]? Even with an effort in the FEP literature to link
priors to phenotypes [49] in the FEP’s framework, existence just means the attainment of a
steady state in a system without explaining its evolutionary history. However, such a per-
spective is flawed as it cannot encompass a system’s changing phase space or non-steady
probability densities related to the system’s states, both of which might prove essential in
understanding life phenomena.
In other words, the FEP suffers from circularity because it a priori assumes conditions
that are to be maintained. No novelty can emerge without further assumptions within this
model. For Friston and colleagues, “A particle or person is never ‘off’ their manifold—they
just occupy states that are more or less likely, given the kind of thing they are” [13]. Still,
life phenomena deserve further explanation, namely why does identity remain in an ever-
changing universe? Is identity merely epistemic or contextually ontic? If it is the latter,
why do such contexts allow for the emergence of individual systems? The FEP framework
simply takes as given that particles, persons or any system whatsoever are “the kind of
thing they are”. That may be enough for science, but it is far from enough for philosophy.
In short, the contextuality of system/environment separation always lurks behind any
would-be fundamental theory of life and sentience, and the FEP framework is not immune
to that. The FEP deserves credit for showing how “action and perception look as if they are
minimizing a particular entropy” [13]. Yet, it is only too well-known that physics still faces
a fragmentary landscape regarding the application of variational principles to free energy
minimization or entropy production. What is more, a pragmatic approach seems the only
way forward as far as “the empirical and numerical evidence appears to suggest that there is
no universal entropy production functional that is maximized in all problems” ([57], p. 19).
Nonetheless, in as far as its limitations are acknowledged, such circularities need not
result in a drawback for the theory. The FEP might be circular, but, in moving around
a circle whose foundations are accepted, it provides epistemic gain through a unified
principle featuring homeostatic-like phases in living systems’ complex phase space. There,
any system characterized as possessing a Markov blanket “can be cast as performing some
elemental form of inference—and possessing an implicit generative model” [13]. As a good
ally to complexity sciences, FEP formalism introduces a specific frame in which meaning
itself might emerge as intimately related to systems’ survival and natural selection: “Events
that happen to an organism mean something to that organism if those events affect its well-
being or reproductive abilities. In short, the meaning of an event is what tells one how to
respond to it . . . This focus on fitness is one way I can make sense of the notion of meaning
and apply it to biological information-processing systems” ([58], p. 184). Even so, the FEP’s
circularities remind us of its contextually limited explanatory power; in complex systems,
“who or what actually perceives the meaning of situations so as to take appropriate actions?
This is essentially the question of what constitutes consciousness or self-awareness in living
systems . . . [This is one] among the most profound mysteries in complex systems and in
science in general. Although this mystery has been the subject of many books of science
and philosophy, it has not yet been completely explained to anyone’s satisfaction” ([58],
p. 184). Hence, the objections to MM raised here also impinge on scientific attempts at
using the FEP to understand the emergence of inference, representation or meaning. More
specifically, the FEP is explanatory as a way of making predictions “as if” an extant physical
system behaves with a dual geometry. However, the FEP does not explain the existence of
inference, representation or meaning in nature.
8. Conclusions
Throughout the previous sections, this paper has submitted the FEP framework
(Section 2) to profound philosophical inspection. It has nuanced previous examination of
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the FEP from Colombo and Wright [12] in the following sense: whereas general criticisms
of the FEP as a GUT in terms of epistemic pluralism seem misplaced, since they tend
to cut off the spirit of scientific reduction and theoretical scientific progress (Section 3),
other criticisms from mechanists and organicists stand and ask for deeper metaphysical
scrutiny (Section 4). The opportunity for such scrutiny comes on the back of FEP theorists
embracing philosophy in a recent publication [13], where they defend so-called Markovian
Monism (MM) (Section 5). This is good news for interdisciplinary work between science
and philosophy without explicitly requiring scientific explanatory pluralism.
MM was presented and reviewed in this paper by making explicit the FEP’s implicit
assumptions, which Friston and colleagues insufficiently disclosed (Section 6). In particular,
MM does not tackle the emergence of representation through evolution, taking for granted
some living systems’ specific cognitive ability. More importantly, MM veils the assumptions
behind separating system and environment via a Markov blanket. Such drawbacks heavily
stymie a FEP interpretation consistent with MM. Nonetheless, inasmuch as the FEP itself is
not committed to MM, such critiques do not invalidate the epistemic advancement that
the FEP framework provides. Even though the FEP may incur in circular reasoning, this
drawback simply weighs upon its Markovian monist interpretation, and not necessarily
on its value as a generalized heuristic principle for better characterization of homeostatic
phases in already extant biological systems (Section 7). The FEP’s recourse to Markov
blankets induces circular causalities between living systems and the environment, which,
freed from MM interpretations, can go beyond circular reasoning.
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